North Korea: An Analysis of the International Repercussions of Juche Ideology Read online

assistance from America. On the side of the North Korean government, Kim Jong-Un must appear as a strong leader in front of his military who has questioned his authority. If he were to become more open to American assistance, it would give the military a much easier reason to rebel against him. On the other hand, Kim Jong-Un must also ensure that his domestic population is not starving to prevent rebellion and to display the superiority of his “Workers’ Paradise” to the world. From the perspective of the United States, it can be assumed that any foreign aid used will be intended to weaken the credibility of the North Korean government. However, with state-controlled media in North Korea, the motivations for American foreign assistance can easily be warped. As said earlier, the United States also is fearful of misdistribution of the foreign aid by the government and the political elite. To conclude, the likely outcome thus far is unclear, and both states must walk a fine line in terms of how foreign aid is given and received.

  As a part of Bush’s “Axis of Evil”, Iran’s relationship with North Korea is critical to their mutual survival—as well as the survival of Juche independence. If one state were to weaken and roll back support of the other, the networking and collaboration between the two would cripple quickly, and would inadvertently reduce their collective security. Consequently, international actions and relations of one state often mirror and follow suit with those of the other state. As a much-cited example, North Korea continues to publicly endorse Iranian pursuit of nuclear development programs that is much similar in their objectives to the previous North Korean objectives. Additionally, Iran continues to mimic North Korean approaches towards gaining international lenience and appeasement of nuclear programs. In Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s (2013) warning speech to the United Nations and to President Obama’s proposals of creating more tolerance, he argued against Iranian president Hassan Rouhani’s policies, saying that Rouhani:

  [Has] another reason to believe that he can get away with [nuclear development]. And that reason is called North Korea. Like Iran, North Korea also said its nuclear program was for peaceful purposes. Like Iran, North Korea also offered meaningless concessions and empty promises in return for sanctions relief.

  Regarding Israel’s relationship with the matter, Israel has bombed a North Korean nuclear facility in Syria in 2007, along with the speculated assistance of CIA intelligence reports, which clearly served a display of western disapproval of North Korea-Middle East alliances (Kalman, 2012). Additionally, North Korea has received an estimated $2 billion from Iran and Syria in exchange for plutonium to be enriched (Duk-Ki, 2012, p. 18). The most commonly perceived motivation for North Korea’s sales of tools for nuclear development to Iran has been as a means for North Korea to obtain much-needed foreign currency reserves, oil, and other natural resources (Duk-Ki, 2012, p. 60; Shuja, 2007, p. 433). Moreover, this exchange inherently allows North Korea to ameliorate popularity of Juche ideals of Eastern independence of the United States as well as a way to provide further collective security and support for anti-Western policies. Continuing this pursuit of collective security between Tehran and Pyongyang, Duk-Ki (2012) noted that North Korea has also sold Iran “new ‘patrol killer’ craft and submarines equipped with stealth technology” (p. 65) and has exported the same torpedo that North Korea sunk ROKS Cheonan in 2010 (p. 69). With shared experiences of American and United Nations sanctions, North Korea and Iran share a clear and common enemy. As a state, North Korea finds convenient opportunity in supporting Iran. In one respect, North Korea gains desperately needed foreign currency, natural resources, capital, and trade relations with Iran. In another respect, Iran gains its desired plutonium for its enrichment programs and more potential for nuclear weapons and thus, international acknowledgment and power. Together, North Korea and Iran feel a greater sense of mutual security and independence from Euro-American influence. In essence, the core of North Korean-Iranian relations is distinctly marked by the critical need for collective security and the desire for independence from the west.

  The motivations and actions of North Korean foreign policy are immensely dynamic and ever-changing. As a leader, Kim Jong-Un must strongly display the ideas of his father Kim Jong-Il and his grandfather (and Eternal Leader) Kim Il-Sung. Meanwhile, along with power struggles inside the military, North Korea’s domestic population suffers from oppression and starvation. From the government alone, 1.6 million North Koreans have been killed (Rummels, 2002). From simply malnutrition, the average North Korean averages several inches shorter than his or her relative in South Korea (Lowe & Wohns, 2013, p. 1). Meanwhile, national reverence of Juche appears to remain strong, but Kim’s legitimacy is silently challenged and questioned by the inner elite. Kim Jong-Un must showboat North Korean military might in the face of American influence and domestic power struggles, but must also receive foreign aid from them to feed his starving population. Meanwhile, North Korea’s special relationship with Iran maintains a sense of Eastern independence from the United States and European influences. However, with recent talks and improving of relations between President Obama and Hassan Rouhani, the sustainability of this collective security comes into question. If the United States improves its Iranian relations, North Korea will be forced to either take a more extreme international stance or succumb to American influence and control from its lack of shared resources and military support from Iran. Consequently, the question of North Korea’s political sustainability arises. To say that North Korea will liberalize is “just speculation”, as Seong-Ho (2013) said, and that a revolution is more likely to occur than the North Korean government loosening or liberalizing its policies. As a state, “The Hermit Kingdom” of North Korea will have to face extremely difficult decisions in the following decades in terms of foreign policy. If it does not succeed with its goals, there is great likelihood that North Korea may crumble and become a failed state. With respect to nuclear development and American relations, reception of foreign aid, and North Korea’s relationship with Iran, the world will likely soon see the final result of success or failure of Juche ideology.

  References

  Bush, R. C., III, & Pollack, J. D. (2013, February 12). The implications of North Korea's third nuclear test.The Brookings Institution. Retrieved October 1, 2013, from https://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/02/12-north-korea-bush-pollack

  Duk-Ki, K. (2012). The Republic of Korea's counter-asymmetric strategy. Naval War College Review,65(1), 55-74. Retrieved September 26, 2013.

  Kalman, A. (2012, September 10). Israel used 17 tons of explosives to destroy Syrian reactor in 2007, magazine says. The Times of Israel. Retrieved September 30, 2013, from https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-uses-17-tons-of-explosives-to-destroy-syrian-reactor/

  Lee, G. (2003). The political philosophy of Juche. Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, 3(1), 105-112.

  Lowe, M., & Wohns, A. (2013, February 25). Food for thought. Harvard International Review. Retrieved September 26, 2013, from https://hir.harvard.edu/food-for-thought

  Manyin, M. E., & Nikitin, M. B. (2013). CRS: Foreign assistance to North Korea (pp. 1-19, Rep.). Washington, D.C., District of Colombia: Congressional Research Service.

  McCurry, J. (2012, July 16). North Korean military chief is removed in possible sign of power struggle. The Guardian. Retrieved October 12, 2013, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/16/north-korean-military-chief-removed

  Netanyahu, B. (2013, October 11). Rouhani is a wolf in sheep's clothing. Address presented in New York, New York.

  Rummels, R. J. (2002, November 25). Statistics of democide. University of Hawaii. Retrieved October 18, 2013, from https://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.CHAP10.HTM

  Seong-Ho, J. (2012, November 30). The Future of North Korea. Harvard International Review. Retrieved October 16, 2013, from https://hir.harvard.edu/youth-on-fire/the-future-of-north-korea

  Shuja, S. (2007). America, North Korea, and Iran. Contemporary Review, 289(1687), 432-441. Retrieved September 26, 2013.
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